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1. Introduction 
On-street parking pricing receives much attention in economic theory (e.g., Arnott et al., 1991; 
Verhoef et al., 1995). Theory recommends that parking prices should be used to allocate on-
street parking places to users with the highest willingness to pay (Vickrey, 1954). In contrast to 
this recommendation, many cities allocate street parking to residents by supplying residential 
parking permits almost free of charge and by creating ‘residential permit holders only’ districts. 
The idea is to make it cheaper and easier for residents to find a vacant parking place, but the 
residential parking permits distort the parking market, as street parking is inefficiently allocated.1 
Residential parking permits are particularly common in European countries. In the UK, 
‘residential permit holders only’ districts can be observed in the smallest villages as well as in 
the main cities. A good example is the wealthy borough of Kensington and Chelsea, where 82 
per cent of the 34,000 on-street parking places are allocated to residential permit holders only, 
and the number of permits exceeds the number of street parking places. While residents pay 
£0.30 per day for a parking permit, the parking costs for non-residents are £30 per day 
(Kensington and Chelsea, 2012). Similarly, in the pre-1930 district of Amsterdam, there are 
about 100,000 street parking places, whereas the number of residential parking permits is about 
the same (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2000).  
Residential parking permits seem not extremely common in the US, perhaps because 
minimum parking regulations usually induce an oversupply of off-street parking (Shoup, 2005; 
                                                            
1 One potentially politically feasible solution to avoid this inefficiency is to give residents the option to 
sell their parking permit. We come back to this in the conclusion. 
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Cutter and Franco, 2012). Nevertheless, they can be found in San Francisco, Chicago and Boston 
and have recently been approved in New York.2  
We are not aware of any estimates in the literature about the induced welfare losses of 
residential permits. In the current paper we aim to derive these costs for parking permits that are 
offered to Dutch residents who live within large shopping districts. These districts are mixed and, 
almost always, contain both shops and residential housing, so shoppers and residents have a 
demand for parking in the same location. Frequently, the demand by shoppers and residents 
occurs at the same time.3 Residents in shopping districts with paid parking receive parking 
permits. 
In the Netherlands, mixed shopping districts are the norm (see Wheaton, 2004, for a 
discussion of mixed areas). Most shops are located within (historic) city centres or within 
suburban residential districts. In these mixed districts, the shoppers’ willingness to pay for 
parking per unit of time is likely an order of magnitude higher than the residents' willingness to 
pay. For example, in Amsterdam, the residents' willingness to pay for parking is maximally nine 
euro per day (but usually much less), whereas for non-residents who park it is at least five euro 
per hour (Van Ommeren et al., 2011). The main reason for this difference is that the willingness 
to pay per unit of time is a decreasing function of parking duration and non-residents typically 
                                                            
2 In New York politicians are concerned that the recently opened Brooklyn Barclays Centre, a sports 
arena with limited parking, might have negative consequences for residents parking (CBS New York, 
2011). 
3 A recent poll for the West of Amsterdam indicates that 50% of households with a residential parking 
permit use the car at most one day per week (Trajan, 2009). 
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park for a much shorter duration than residents. 4  Virtually everywhere in the Netherlands 
residents in paid-parking districts receive on-street parking permits. Residential parking permits 
are distortionary if the parking supply is not fully elastic, because residents consume more on-
street parking and shoppers consume less on-street parking than would be optimal. Knowledge of 
the parking supply function within shopping districts is then useful to derive the order of 
magnitude of welfare effects of residential parking permits. 
In the current paper, we estimate the (inverse) parking supply function using a dataset of 
about 300 of the largest shopping districts in the Netherlands. Importantly, we employ a unique 
dataset with detailed information about street and garage capacity. Our main finding is that 
parking supply is quite elastic, but far from perfectly elastic. This suggests that parking policies 
that provide parking permits to residents increase parking costs for non-residents, which has 
negative implications for welfare. Our results suggest that the Dutch residential parking permits 
policy induces an annual deadweight loss of about 30% of the parking supply costs in shopping 
districts, which is about 300 million euros per year. 
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we will discuss the main 
theoretical considerations to estimate the deadweight losses of a residential parking permit 
policy. In section 3, we will focus on the empirical results. Section 4 discusses the welfare 
implications and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                            
4 For example, the average parking duration for non-residents is about one hour in Almere, a city of about 
200,000 inhabitants in the Netherlands, see Kobus et al. (2012). 
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2. Theoretical considerations 
The deadweight loss of a residential parking permit policy depends on the properties of the 
residents' and non-residents’ demand and supply functions. In the current paper, we will estimate 
the (inverse) supply function relevant to non-residents. By making assumptions on the demand 
function we are able to determine the boundaries of the deadweight loss. 
In order to identify the parking supply curve, we make the assumption that street and 
garage parking are perfect substitutes for non-residents (i.e. parking is a homogeneous good). So, 
we will estimate the parking cost function ignoring the type of parking (garage or street parking) 
that is supplied.  
Although most non-residents will be largely indifferent between on-street and garage 
parking, one may argue that they are not perfect substitutes, for example because they are not at 
exactly the same location (as argued by Kobus et al., 2012). However, these differences tend to 
be small within the same shopping district, so the perfect-substitution assumption is a reasonable 
approximation. 
There is a large empirical literature on parking demand.5 However, as far as we know, 
there is only one empirical study about parking supply which does not apply to shopping 
districts.6 Parking supply is likely perfectly price elastic in out-of-town shopping malls with large 
outdoor car parks (Hasker and Inci, 2011), but this is unlikely to be true for parking within mixed 
shopping districts which combine street and garage parking places. When parking supply 
                                                            
5 About 25 years ago, Feeney (1989) reviews already 20 revealed parking demand studies. For more 
recent contributions, see, for example, Kelly and Clinch (2006; 2009). Stated-preference studies are also 
common, see e.g. Axhausen and Polak (1991) and Hensher and King (2001). 
6 This study reports that the long-run supply function of employer-owned parking near office buildings is 
perfectly elastic (Van  Ommeren and Wentink,  2012). 
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includes garage parking, it is unlikely that parking supply is perfectly elastic.7 Note that it is a 
misconception that street parking is perfectly inelastic, even within historical city centres, 
because parking places may be converted into pedestrian areas or street lanes, which reduces 
traffic congestion (Arnott and Inci, 2006).  
When interpreting the empirical results, we will assume that parking suppliers are free to 
set parking prices. As a benchmark assumption, which will be relaxed later on, we start to 
assume that (public and private) suppliers apply marginal cost pricing, in line with the 
competitive-market assumption. Given the strong competition of suppliers within and, in 
particular, between shopping districts, this may be a reasonable assumption.8 We emphasize 
however that if suppliers do not apply marginal cost pricing, then we still obtain consistent 
estimates of the inverse supply function, when this difference is random.9 So, the marginal cost 
pricing assumption generates consistent estimates when parking is not systematically over- or 
undersupplied. There are many reasons to believe that the marginal cost pricing assumption does 
not hold. We will discuss these reasons one by one and explain how this affects our estimation 
procedure. 
                                                            
7 Garage parking implies substantial fixed cost. In addition, marginal building costs for underground 
parking increase steeply with the number of parking levels. Arguably, there are constant returns to scale 
in terms of number of garages. So, in districts that contain only garage parking, parking supply may be 
perfectly elastic (see, Arnott and Inci, 2006). These districts are rare in our dataset. 
8 The empirical finding that shoppers' choice of parking is very price elastic for longer parking durations 
(Kobus et al., 2012), also suggest that monopolistic competition is not so much an issue when using 
parking prices for long durations. 
9 Differences are expected to exist, for example because parking supply may change only slowly over 
time. Given unexpected strong demand, commercial parking operators may set temporarily prices above 
marginal costs, but, given unexpected weak demand, the opposite may occur.  
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One fundamental criticism of the marginal cost pricing assumption is that local 
monopolistic behaviour by commercial parking garages is likely present (Arnott, 2006; Arnott 
and Rowse, 2009a). The literature argues that this has substantial consequences for welfare when 
street parking is priced far below the garage price, so cruising for street parking is common. As 
we shall see, this situation does not occur in the Netherlands, where on-street and garage prices 
are roughly equal. 
Another criticism is that the presence of second-degree (nonlinear) price discrimination is 
strongly suggested by the well-known observation that parking usually occurs at a price discount 
for longer parking durations (National Parking Association, 2009).10 Prices for short durations 
then exceed marginal costs, whereas prices for long durations equal marginal costs.11 Hence, to 
deal with second-degree price discrimination, we will use prices per day rather than per hour. 
There are however also other reasons to use prices per day. In particular, it does not require 
additional information about the average daily occupancy rate. As we lack this information, it 
makes more sense to focus on day prices. 
The welfare loss of residential parking permit policy depends not only on the number of 
residential parking permits issued but also on other local government policies. First, and most 
importantly, because street parking is the dominant form of supply, it will depend on its setting 
of on-street prices. It is well known that setting street prices far below garage prices will induce 
cruising for parking (Shoup, 2005; Calthrop and Proost, 2006). We will document for our data 
                                                            
10 The observation that prices vary within the day (e.g., night prices are often zero) is not evidence of 
third-degree price discrimination, because the daily parking supply costs are fixed. 
11 Local governments may set parking charges above marginal costs for shorter durations for a completely 
different reason: to charge for car congestion, in line with recommendations by Glazer and Niskanen 
(1992). 
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that on-street prices in the Netherlands are approximately equal to garage prices, so we will 
assume away any cruising externalities (which is in line with Van Ommeren et al., 2012, who 
show that the average on-street cruising time for shopping activities is less than one minute). 
 Second, the welfare loss will depend on any regulation of commercial garage parking 
prices. Price regulation of commercial operators is rare, also because commercial suppliers 
hardly ever have a dominant position, so they have little market power. However, price 
regulation does occur in shopping districts with only one or two dominant commercial garage 
parking suppliers and little street parking (e.g., within the innercities of Almere, Maastricht). In 
these shopping districts, price regulation is applied in order to induce marginal cost pricing. 
Third, and most importantly, parking is related to a number of negative externalities 
which are usually addressed by non-price regulation of parking. It is relevant here to distinguish 
between negative externalities of the parking site (as parking sites are considered ugly) and any 
negative externalities related to car travel (e.g., congestion, pollution).  
Many districts are in historic centres (built before 1930), where construction of 
residential, and particularly non-residential, buildings is strongly regulated to protect historic 
amenities which create substantial benefits as they attract tourists and increase house prices 
(Leichenko, et al. 2001). For this reason, in Dutch shopping districts over the last 30 years, with 
few exceptions, the construction of parking sites has been heavily regulated, and in practice only 
underground parking garages have been allowed. This type of regulation must have strongly 
increased the private cost of parking provision (although land prices in many shopping centres 
are sufficiently high to justify underground parking garages even in the absence of regulation). 
So, this type of regulation shifts the private supply curve upward, but this has furthermore no 
consequences for our estimation strategy. 
 9 
 
The other negative externality related to parking is that negative externalities of car use 
are not priced. As a second-best solution, these negative externalities can be (partially) 
internalised using restrictions on parking using maximum norms regarding the number of 
parking places. Given appropriate pricing of on-street parking, maximum requirements may 
improve welfare when traffic congestion is not internalized (Shoup 2005; Arnott and Rowse, 
2009a). Minimum requirements may improve welfare when street parking is under-priced (as it 
reduces cruising). Minimum requirements are less important in the Netherlands.  
Maximum  requirements may be interpreted as a (second-best) policy when pricing of 
traffic congestion is not feasible, because congestion induces a difference between the private 
cost curve, Sp, and the social cost curve, Ss, as shown in Figure 3. By restricting the number of 
parking places (q1 in Figure 3), the government may move away from the market equilibrium, A, 
to another equilibrium, B. The parking supplier earns an additional profit, C, because there is a 
difference between the social and private marginal cost. This equilibrium offers a higher welfare 
when the additional profit is passed onto the local government (or passed to the inhabitants as a 
lump sum).12 This is usually case because most parking supply (all street parking and about half 
the garages places) are owned by the local government. So, most additional revenues due to 
maximum parking requirements go to the local government (in addition, governments extract 
profits from private operators by granting building concessions). In the welfare analysis, we will 
assume that local governments determine the socially optimal number of parking places and are 
able to. So we aim to estimate the social, not the private, cost curve.  
 
 
                                                            
12 For example  the largest Dutch parking operator is largely owned by the pension-fund for civil servants. 
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3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Data and descriptives 
We use a dataset about parking in 308 of the largest shopping districts of the Netherlands for the 
year 2007 (Parkeermonitor, 2007-2008). The data include only large shopping districts. On 
average, a shopping district contains about 31,000 square meters of floor area, containing about 
200 shops on average. The total floor area in our dataset comprises 34 per cent of all floor area in 
the whole country (about 28 million square meters).  
Parking refers to all garage and street parking places up to one hundred meters from the 
shopping district boundary that are available to the public.13  We ignore parking places owned by 
residents for two reasons: first, the number of privately-owned parking places is small (for 
example, in Amsterdam about 5 to 10 per cent of residents in shopping districts possesses a 
privately owned, see Van Ommeren et al., 2011). Second, these parking places are unavailable to 
shoppers.  
On average, there are about 1,700 parking places per district: 1,200 on-street and 500 in 
garages.14 Garage parking is present in about half of the districts, whereas street parking is 
almost always (94% of the shopping districts) present. Descriptives are reported in Table 1, 
including descriptives about three subsamples (only garage parking; garage parking present; only 
street parking). Table 1 shows that the average garage parking share, defined as the ratio of 
                                                            
13 The consultancy firm which collected the data defines shopping districts by a minimum number of 
shops or minimum floor area. Although the boundaries of these shopping districts are subjectively 
chosen, in most cases it is perfectly feasible to define shopping district boundaries rather precisely. This is 
particularly easy when the shopping area is largely pedestrianized. 
14 In our data, we are not able to distinguish between street parking and outdoor car parks, so street 
parking includes outdoor car parks. 
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garage capacity to total capacity, is equal to 0.22 (in districts with garage parking, the average is 
0.42, so also then street parking outnumbers garage parking). The average number of parking 
places per 100 square meters of shopping district is slightly more than six. This value is roughly 
the same when garage parking is present, indicating that the relationship between number of 
parking places and floor area is not fundamentally dependent on the presence of garage 
parking.15 We have information about parking prices per hour (for the first hour) and per day. In 
about half of the districts, prices are zero (but in only 20 per cent of districts with garage 
parking). 
The average street price is €0.69 per hour, slightly below the average garage price of 
€0.93.16 When garage and street parking are both present in the same district the average street 
price is €1.06 per hour, which slightly exceeds the average garage price of €0.93 per hour. To 
measure supply costs, we will ignore any existing difference between these prices, consistent 
with the assumption that the street and garage parking are perfect substitutes. We will use the 
maximum of street and garage prices per district, which will be referred to as the ‘parking price’. 
The average hour parking price is €0.81 (see Table 1). Using the maximum per district is rather 
arbitrary, but using other measures, such as the average per district, generates almost identical 
results.   
The average parking price per day is €5.13, about six times higher than the price for the 
first hour (implying that parking for longer than six hours occurs at a discount). The data allow 
us to distinguish between different shopping districts locations within cities: central locations 
                                                            
15 However, for the few districts without street parking, this ratio is three times lower, so the amount of 
parking per floor area is lower. 
16 Given paid parking, the average street price is € 1.50 per hour, in line with other sources (e.g., Van 
Dijken, 2002) 
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(e.g., at least 400 shops in the largest inner cities), periphery locations and out-of-town shopping 
centres (containing few, but large shops). 
 
Table 1: Descriptives 
  Garage parking only 
Obs. Mean SD Min Max Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Hour street price 290 0.69 0.83 0 4.6      
Hour garage price 161 0.93 0.93 0 5.2 18 0.57 0.89 0 2 
Hour price difference 143 0.09 0.75 -3.7 2.1       
Hour parking price  308 0.80 0.95 0 5.2  18 0.57 0.89 0 2 
Day street price 276 3.84 6.10 0 41.4       
Day garage price 159 7.00 7.66 0 47.5  18 7.39 10.51 0 36 
Day price difference 138 -0.98 5.57 -14 18.4       
Day parking price  292 5.13 7.04 0 47.5  18 7.39 10.51 0 36 
Street parking places 308 1172 1018 0 8000      
Garage parking places 308 501 1000 0 7561 18 829 1757 52 7561 
Parking places 308 1673 1675 30 11167      
Garage parking share 308 0.22 0.29 0 1      
Floor area (x1000) 308 30.6 31.0 4.1 238.2 18 27.5 27.7 5.7 98.6 
Parking places/100 m² 308 6.44 4.03 0.30 24.59  18 2.16 2.32 0.39 9.65 
 Garage capacity present On-street parking only 
Obs. Mean SD Min Max Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Hour street price 143 1.06 0.90 0 4.6 147 0.33 0.58 0 2.1 
Hour garage price 161 0.93 0.93 0 5.2      
Hour price difference 143 0.09 0.75 -3.7 2.1       
Hour parking price  161 1.23 1.02 0 5.2  147 0.33 0.58 0 2.1 
Day street price 139 5.79 7.07 0 41.4  137 1.86 4.08 0 18.9 
Day garage price 159 7.00 7.67 0 47.5       
Day price difference 139 -0.98 5.57 -14 18.4       
Day parking price  155 8.02 7.81 0 47.5  137 1.86 4.08 0 18.9 
Street parking places 161 1373 1281 0 8000 147 952 535 30 3279 
Garage parking places 161 958 1216 24 7561      
Parking places 161 2331 2052 52 11167      
Garage parking share 161 0.42 0.29 0.04 1      
Floor area (x1000) 161 42.5 37.6 5.4 238.2 147 17.6 12.3 4.1 82.7 
Parking places/100 m² 161 6.40 4.02 0.39 23.84  147 6.48 4.05 0.30 24.59 
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Note: price difference = street price – garage street price. Parking price = max (street price, garage price)  In 
addition to parking prices and quantities data from Parkeermonitor, we use data about median 
rent for shop space (per square meter) per district to proxy land prices within cities, which is 
obtained from transaction data provided by PropertyNl (see also Van Ommeren and Wentink, 
2012). We also use data about municipality population as well as population density per 
municipality obtained from Statistics Netherlands (2008). 
According to CROW (2008), most shops need between 2.5 and 4 parking places per 
hundred square meter floor space (it is not clear to what extent price of parking is included in this 
calculation). This allows us to do some consistency checks on the data. The parking places in 
shopping districts we focus on are also used by residents, so it makes sense that the total parking 
supply exceeds the maximum requirement in most shopping districts (Figure 1). When garage 
parking is present, shoppers still make use of street parking, so it makes sense that garage supply 
is usually less than the minimum requirement, see Figure 2.  
 
Figure 1. Number of parking places per 100 square meter of shopping area. The highlighted bars 
indicate the observations that are within the range of adviced parking requirements of CROW (2008). 
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Figure 2. Number of garage parking places per 100 square meter of shopping area. Areas with garage 
parking only. The highlighted bars indicate the observations that are within the range of adviced parking 
requirements of CROW (2008). 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Empirical Approach 
We estimate the inverse supply function for non-residents parking, so we estimate the price of a 
parking place as a function of the number of parking places. We estimate the inverse parking 
supply function rather than the supply function, because only for the inverse function we are able 
to find valid instruments to deal with endogeneity, as discussed later on. We assume a linear 
specification, so: 
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݌௜௠ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚݍ௜௠ ൅ ߛݔ௜௠ ൅ ߜݔ௠ ൅ ߝ௜௠.                                        ሺ1ሻ 
where pim denotes the parking price of shopping district i in municipality m; qim denotes the 
parking quantity xim denotes district-specific control variables, xm denotes a municipality-specific 
control variable and εim is an error term. We also estimate log-log models where both the 
dependent and explanatory variables are in logarithms. 
One important issue is that the price of parking may vary between districts, because of 
between-district variation in land prices. Because land prices are unknown, we proxy land prices 
in several ways. In a basic specification, we use municipality population, municipality 
population density and within-city shopping district location. 
In addition, in a more elaborate specification, we estimate models where we include 
municipality fixed effects, δm, as well as median rents for shop space per district as a proxy for 
land prices.17 So, we estimate: 
݌௜௠ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚݍ௜௠ ൅ ߛݔ௜௠ ൅ ߜ௠ ൅ ߝ௜௠.                                        ሺ2ሻ 
To identify the inverse supply function of parking, we have to take into account that ݍ௜௠  
also depends on demand, so qim is endogenous and qim is correlated to εim. We deal with this issue 
using an instrumental-variables approach. To identify the inverse parking supply function, we 
use floor shopping area as an instrument. Hence, we argue that the floor shopping area captures 
the shoppers' demand for parking, but does not directly affect the cost of parking, and therefore 
the inverse parking supply function.18 This instrument seems plausible, particularly given the 
                                                            
17 We do not control for median rents in the specification without municipality fixed effects, because we 
frequently miss information about rents in smaller municipalities with one shopping district. These 
observations essentially dropout given municipality fixed effects. 
18 Note that larger shopping districts (in terms of shopping floor area) are almost always larger in terms of 
streets, so the number of street places is directly related to the size of shopping floor area. Consequently, 
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range of controls for land prices. We emphasize that the instrument relies on the more 
fundamental assumption that parking supply costs do not determine the size of the floor shopping 
area. This assumption seems reasonable, as parking costs are small compared to overall 
expenses. This is particularly reasonable in the Dutch context where only a minority of shoppers 
travel by car (e.g., Mingardo and Van Meerkerk, 2012). We emphasise that this instrument shifts 
the demand curve and therefore identifies the social parking supply curve when regulation is 
present. So, for example, the instrument is valid given the presence of maximum requirements as 
long as these requirements are optimal from a welfare perspective. 
 
Table 2: Inverse parking supply functions  
Price IV Tobit  IV Tobit (Log-log) 
   Garage present   Garage present 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parking places (/1000) 3.168** 3.395** 2.785** 2.843** 0.995** 1.196** 0.880** 0.945** 
(0.284) (0.321) (0.320) (0.392) (0.132) (0.183) (0.156) (0.249) 
Municipality population 14.4** 12.1** 11.1** 11.1** 0.448** 0.324** 0.325** 0.316** 
(2.69) (3.27) (3.48) (4.41) (0.082) (0.121) (0.098) (0.160) 
Municipality population density 0.771 0.636 0.386 0.352 0.142 0.114 0.050 0.043 
(0.408) (0.413) (0.476) (0.483) (0.089) (0.092) (0.105) (0.106) 
Shopping district type no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Log likelihood -2739 -2712 -1496 -1487 -471 -450 -237 -227 
No of observations 275 275 138 138 275 275 138 138 
No  of observations below 
threshold 141 141 36 36 141 141 36 36 
F-test (weak instruments) 754.05 669.77 399.20 284.26 245.24 140.19 161.04 71.74 
Note: municipality population in millions. Municipality population density in thousand persons per square meter. The censoring 
threshold is €2 or ln €2 in the log-log specification. * Significant at 5 per cent level, ** Significant at 1 per cent level. 
 
One issue we have to deal with is that in many districts, parking is free to non-residents 
(in our dataset that turns out to be about 50 per cent, in particular when garage parking is absent). 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
floor area is invalid as an instrument to estimate parking supply functions, whereas perfectly valid for 
inverse parking supply functions. 
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Parking may be free because there is excess parking supply, so the marginal costs are zero. 
Another reason is that these zero prices do not reflect marginal parking costs, either because the 
local government directly subsidizes parking (by buying land and converting into street or garage 
parking), or because the shop owners pay for parking (Hasker and Inci, 2011). The third reason 
is that the (suppliers') transaction costs of paid parking are not negligible (in the Netherlands 
normally electronic parking machines). Van Dijken (2002) reports that they are about €350 per 
place per year, suggesting that it is not cost-effective for suppliers to charge parking when the 
cost of provision of parking (excluding charging costs) are rather low (e.g. less than one euro per 
day). The fourth reason is that the local government enforces maximum parking duration 
restrictions. These restrictions are extremely common in the US, and can be justified as a second-
best policy where policymakers do not have the power to raise the street prices to garage prices 
(Arnott and Rowse, 2009b). However, these restrictions are relatively rare in the Netherlands, 
and if they apply then they only apply to a few streets within a large shopping district. The main 
exception is smaller municipalities with one main shopping district. The main difficulty is that 
we cannot distinguish between these four reasons. 
The above considerations suggest that it may not be wise to remove these zero-price 
observations from the estimation procedure, because it is likely that zero prices are observed 
when the supply costs are low, so removing zero-price observations may create a selection bias. 
We deal therefore with this issue in three different ways.  
First, for observations with parking prices below two euro per day, we do not use 
information about the exact level of the price, but in the estimation procedure we assume that the 
marginal cost per day is below two euro (approximately the level of the transaction costs per day 
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of paying for parking).19 So, we may then estimate Tobit models using a standard maximum-
likelihood procedure, where we have left-censored observations with day prices below two euro.  
Second, we deal with this issue by estimating Tobit models on a subsample of 
observations where garage parking is present. In this case, zero prices are observed in only 20 
per cent of the cases. Of course, selecting observations where garage parking is present creates 
another, and arguably a similar, endogeneity issue which is not addressed. However, the 
interpretation of the results is now clearer, as the results refer to districts where garage parking is 
present. These are probably the districts we are most interested in. 
Third, we estimate models including municipality fixed effects (and control for within-
municipality differences in rents for shop space). This essentially excludes observations for 
which there is only one observation per municipality from the estimation procedure. The zero-
price observations are predominantly in smaller municipalities, in which there is only one 
dominant shopping district, so for which we only have one observation. For the subset of 
observations with at least two observations per municipality, the share of observations with zero 
prices drops to only 20 per cent. For this subset, we estimate Tobit models and linear models 
after excluding zero-price observations.  
 
3.3 Main results 
The use of floor shopping area as an instrument is key to our estimation procedure. We have 
tested the validity of the instrument in several ways. First, we use an F-test to determine the 
strength of the instrument. In all specifications, the F-tests were positive, so the instrument is 
strong. Second, we have estimated models where we do not use the floor shopping area as an 
                                                            
19 For hourly observations, we assume that the marginal cost per hour is below €0.30. 
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instrument, but its two main components: the floor area dedicated to daily shopping (e.g., a 
supermarket) and the floor area dedicated to non-daily shopping (e.g., clothing). When we use 
these two instruments, we find almost identical results.  
Third, more informally, we have tested whether the size of the floor area increases the 
garage parking share. One expects that floor area has a positive effect on this share, because an 
increase in demand for shopping area and therefore for land makes it more beneficial to 
substitute land for capital (high land prices is normally the main reason that garage parking is 
supplied). This expectation is confirmed by a two-limit Tobit analysis (with thresholds equal to 0 
and 1 and the same explanatory variables as used in the inverse supply function).20 
The main results are reported in Tables 2 and 3. All specifications show that an increase 
in parking capacity results in a strong increase in costs of parking. We are particularly interested 
in the marginal effects of parking capacity, conditional that the price asked exceeds the threshold 
(when the price below the threshold, the relationship between prices and costs is less likely one-
to-one). These marginal effects are equal to the reported coefficients of the Tobit model. 
To interpret our results, we find it useful to focus on increases in capacity of 500 parking 
places. We have chosen 500 parking places, because the mean number of garage parking places 
is 500. So our experiment is that we want to know what happens to (marginal) parking costs 
when the number of garage parking places is increased from 0 to 500 as a result of increases in 
residential parking demand due to parking permit policies. We emphasize that 500 is not a large 
                                                            
20 One may use the garage parking share as an alternative indicator for the cost of parking using shopping 
floor area as an instrument for the number of parking places. We find a positive effect of the number of 
parking places on this share (the full results are in the Appendix, Table A1): the share increases by about 
0.10 when the number of parking places increases by thousand. This result seems reasonable suggesting 
that floor area is an appropriate instrument when estimating cost functions. 
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increase compared with total parking supply per district, which is 1,700 on average, as street 
parking usually dominates garage parking. 
According to specification (1) of Table 2, which assumes a linear specification and uses 
the IV Tobit approach, the marginal effect is about €3.4·10-3, so to increase the supply by 500 
places implies an increase in the daily price of about €1.70. Calculated at the mean, this suggests 
an inverse price elasticity of supply close to one, so the supply of parking is far from perfectly 
elastic, suggesting that policies that increase demand (e.g., residential parking permit policies) 
are quite detrimental for welfare. 
Furthermore, these results imply that in larger cities the supply costs are higher. In a large 
city with 1 million inhabitants (close to the size of Amsterdam), the supply costs per day are 
about €16.4 higher than in the smallest municipalities, ceteris paribus. When we control for 
shopping-district location, which is our preferred specification, we find slightly higher point 
estimates for the effect of number of parking places, see specification (2) of Table 2. When we 
limit our analysis to districts where garage parking is present, we find slightly lower estimates 
(see specifications (3) and (4) of Table 2). Given a log-linear specification (see (5) and (6) of 
Table 2), the effects of parking capacity are very similar: the inverse price elasticity of supply is 
also about one and even less when we focus on districts that include garage parking. 
We have also estimated a range of specifications for models with municipality fixed 
effects and with the median rent for shop space (see Table 3). Again we find that the supply 
function is upward sloping, although slightly less steep than before. For the (preferred) 
specification (2), we now find that the effect is about 2.6·10-3 (compared to 3.4·10-3 in Table 2). 
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3.4 Sensitivity analysis 
We have re-examined these results in many ways. The most important ones will be discussed 
here, and are reported in the Appendix, but we would like to emphasize that other, non-reported, 
specifications generate very similar results. So, our results are extremely robust to specification 
and data selection. 
First of all, we have re-estimated models using different censoring thresholds. This is 
relevant, because the level of the threshold can be argued to be quite arbitrary. We find that the 
results are almost identical if we change the level of the threshold (see Table A2). For example, a 
4 or 10-euro threshold does not substantially alter the supply curve. 
Second, we have re-estimated the model for different categories of municipality size. 
Again, the results are quite robust (see Table A3). For example, if we limit the analysis to 
municipalities with at least 100,000 inhabitants, the slope of the supply curve is somewhat 
decreased.  
Third, we have re-estimated the model using observations for hour prices (see Table A4). 
To compare the results, it is now more convenient to focus on the log-log specification. It 
appears that the inverse parking supply elasticity is reduced, but only by about 0.2, so the results 
are not extremely sensitive to the choice of the price measure. Nevertheless, it suggests that 
parking supply is more sensitive than reported before, so our estimates based on day prices are 
conservative. 
Fourth, we have estimated models without using any instrumental-variable techniques 
(see Table A5). This approach may generate consistent estimates of the supply function but only 
when the supply function is identical for each shopping district (conditional on control 
variables), otherwise the supply estimates are usually downward biased. In line with this idea, it 
appears that the coefficients are substantially lower, although we still find a (statistically-
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significant) positive effect of parking quantity on parking costs in all specifications, except for 
one (specification (8)). 
Fifth, we have assumed the government intervention to be socially optimal. So we have 
assumed that underground parking regulation is welfare improving and conditional on this 
regulation that quantity requirements are optimal. However, this may not always be the case. For 
example, let us suppose that some local governments impose minimum garage parking 
requirements beyond the optimal market equilibrium (e.g., to guarantee sufficient supply for 
residents with parking permits). We don't know in which districts minimum garage parking 
requirements are more likely to occur. However, the distribution of the garage parking places in 
Figure 2 provides some suggestive evidence for the existence of minimum parking requirements. 
The remarkably high frequency of shopping districts just above the “minimum requirement” of 
2.5 (garage) parking place per 100 square meter suggests that there is some degree of (maybe 
distortionary) government regulation in these districts. Excluding these districts does not change 
the empirical results. 
 
Table 3: Inverse parking supply functions, alternative specifications 
Price  IV Linear IV Tobit 
   Garage present   Garage present 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parking places (/1000) 2.119** 2.627** 2.321** 2.730** 2.856** 2.548** 2.721** 2.639** 
(0.366) (0.670) (0.454) (0.834) (0.319) (0.587) (0.346) (0.583) 
Shop space rent (median) 0.030 0.020 0.039 0.029 0.046* 0.041 0.043 0.038 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.033) (0.035) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) 
Shopping district type no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Municipality fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No of observations 48 48 39 39 76 76 48 48 
No of municipality fixed effects 19 19 19 19 21 21 19 19 
F-test (weak instruments) 217.27 65.29 161.54 47.89 344.10 103.23 181.44 62.57 
Observations with zero prices no no no no yes yes yes yes 
Note: results for municipalities with at least two (observations about) shopping districts. For other notes, see Table 2. 
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4 Welfare analyses 
Our welfare analysis will be based on the crucial assumption that the total number of parking 
places in each shopping district is optimally chosen by the government, but there is a welfare 
loss because too much parking is allocated to residents through parking permits. Furthermore we 
will assume that the willingness to pay by shoppers exceeds the willingness to pay of current 
residents with a residential parking permit. If this assumption does not hold for all residents in 
the short run (for example, just after a shopping centre is extended), it is likely to hold in the long 
run when residents with cars will relocate to other residential locations where there are fewer 
shops. 21We emphasise that our welfare calculations do not include any welfare loss for residents 
parking, which means that we underestimate the welfare loss. 
 
                                                            
21 In the long run, except when residential parking permit policies subsidise residents, shopping districts 
will predominantly contain households who have a low demand for residential parking. 
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Figure 3. The private and social cost curve. 
 
To derive the long-term deadweight loss, it would be ideal to have information about the 
demand function for parking by residents as well non-residents (shoppers). We lack this 
information, so we proceed by making assumptions about the shape of the demand functions, so 
we are able to give the range of welfare loss due to residential parking permits. The deadweight 
loss depends then on the number of residential parking permits per district. In the Netherlands, 
when paid parking is introduced, residents receive at least one permit.22 As a result, the 
residential number of parking permits is usually close to the number of street places, so there are 
about 1,700 parking permits provided per shopping district.23 Approximately half of residents 
with a residential parking permit park their car during the day during weekdays shopping hours 
(but a much higher share Saturdays), see e.g. West Amsterdam (2012). In the current paper, we 
will assume that only 500 street parking places, so only 30% of the number of residential parking 
permits are occupied by residents at times when shoppers aim to park. 
In addition, we assume that exactly 500 garage parking places are used by non-residents 
who viit the shops. The remaining 700 street parking places are assumed to be used by residents 
with permits (and used some part of the day) but the deadweight loss of these 700 permits is 
                                                            
22 In smaller cities, the number of permits is equal to the number of cars owned. However, if the parking 
occupancy rate is close to 1, which is more common in residential areas of large cities built before 1930, 
then it is common to restrict the number of parking permits to avoid cruising (e.g., the number of permits 
is restricted to maximally one or two per household. 
23 Because the occupancy rate is essentially one in the evening/night, cruising for street parking by 
residents in the evening is common. Using information about house prices, the average cruising cost for 
residents are estimated to about one euro per day in Amsterdam, see van Ommeren et al. (2011. 
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assumed to be negligible. In this way, we obtain (extremely) conservative estimates of the 
deadweight loss. 
It is assumed that the combined willingness to pay of the 500 permit holders is equal to 
the combined supply costs (A + C is equal to B + C in Figure 4). This assumption is a reasonable 
approximation, because willingness to pay by the 500 residents with a permit as well as the 
supply costs of the first 500 street places will be low relative to the equilibrium price.24  
Given these simplifying assumptions, the deadweight loss can be derived assuming first 
the absence of the parking permit policy, and then allow the inverse parking supply curve to shift 
to the left by 500 units. This shift is indicated in Figure 4 as a shift in the supply function from S 
to S’. This shift in supply affects the non-residents, who are assumed to be the high-demand 
consumers, indicated by the bold demand curve in Figure 4. In this figure, the deadweight loss is 
indicated with DWL. It is tedious but straightforward to show that given linear non-residents' 
demand and supply functions, the deadweight loss per day per shopping district is equal to: 
ܦܹܮ ൌ 12 · ሺܸ ൅ ܳ௦ሻ · ߚ · ܣ,                                                 ሺ3ሻ 
where V denotes the number of non-residents ("visitors"), Qs denotes the undistorted number of 
parking places provided to non-residents in the absence of the provision of parking permits, ߚ 
equals the marginal effect of parking supply on parking prices (per day) and A equals the number 
of parking permits provided to residents. Qs is endogenously determined and depends, among 
                                                            
24 When residents do not receive parking permits, residential parking close to shopping districts will be 
less attractive to residents with a strong preference for cars. So, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
residents’ willingness to pay for street parking is low, given the presence of a parking permit. The 
provision of parking permits reduces the cost of parking for households, preventing efficient household 
sorting across residence locations (see, similarly, Kim, 2012), so the presence of car-loving residents in 
shopping districts is likely the result of parking permit policies. 
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others on the (unknown) price elasticity of demand. It can easily be shown that Qs is 
monotonically increasing in the (absolute) effect of price on parking demand with a minimum 
value of V, when parking demand is fully price elastic, and a maximum value of V + A, when 
parking demand is fully price inelastic. So, for example, when the demand for parking is fully 
price elastic, the deadweight loss per day per shopping district is equal to βAV. 
 
Figure 4. Welfare loss of residential parking permits. 
 
Let us assume now that non-residents' parking demand is perfectly price elastic. When 
removing the residential parking policy (which provides 500 permits), parking prices do not fall, 
but demand for street parking by non-residents increases (by 500 parking places).25 Given (3), 
the deadweight loss per parking place equals €1.28 per day, so €465 per year. When parking 
demand by non-residents is perfectly price inelastic, parking demand does not change, and the 
deadweight loss equals €621 per year. Because most non-residents (excluding commuters) park 
for a short duration, it is usually thought that the demand for parking is rather inelastic. A price 
                                                            
25 In the Netherlands, parking demand is likely more elastic than in other countries, because the majority 
of shoppers do not travel by car, but travel by bicycle or public transport (Mingardo and Becker, 2012). 
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elasticity of demand of -0.3 is sometimes suggested, see Litman (2012).26 Given this value, the 
implied deadweight loss is €585 per year. This is a substantial welfare loss compared to the mean 
yearly cost of a parking place, which is about €1930.  
Given the assumption that the number of parking places is equal to the number of 
households with a car, and that in these shopping districts, only half of the households have a car 
(which is a conservative estimate), the deadweight loss is about €250 per household living in 
these districts, or €125 per capita. Nationwide, the deadweight loss will be €240 to 320 million 
per year according to our conservative estimate (assuming an annual loss of €465 to 621 per 
parking space, 1673 parking places per shopping district and 308 shopping districts). 
We have also re-examined these results for other estimates of the inverse parking supply 
function. The deadweight loss results remain extremely robust. For example, when we assume 
that the marginal effect of parking supply on the price of parking is only €2.4·10-3 (rather than 
€3.4·10-3), which is the lowest point estimate of all our estimates, then the deadweight loss is still 
€429 per year. 
We emphasise that the above estimate is likely an extremely conservative estimate. For 
example, in the plausible case that the number of residential parking permits (and demand for 
parking by non-residents) is larger than presumed, then the annual welfare loss per residential 
parking permit is much higher, because the deadweight loss increases more than proportionally 
in the number of parking permits. So, for example if the number of parking permits is twice as 
high as assumed, then the deadweight loss per parking permit is at least twice high. 
 
                                                            
26 The relevant parking demand sensitivity here is the one that captures changes both at the extensive (the 
decision to park) as well as the intensive margin (the duration of parking).  
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5. Conclusion 
In the current paper, we aim to provide insight into the welfare losses of policies that provide on-
street parking permits to residents almost free of charge. We focus on shopping districts, so 
where there is also a demand for parking by non-residents, in particular shoppers. We derive the 
deadweight loss by estimating (inverse) parking supply functions. Our empirical results indicate 
that parking supply is far from perfectly elastic with an inverse price elasticity of supply of about 
one. This suggests that the ubiquitous provision of residential parking permits substantially 
increases the costs of parking supply. Rough welfare calculations indicate that the provision of 
on-street parking permits induces an annual deadweight loss of about €500 per parking permit, 
which is about 30% of the parking supply costs. 
 A parking permits policy provides advantages to local residents that are denied to non-
residents. It is well known that residents have strong incentives to prevent local policies that are 
welfare improving (see, for example, Glaeser et al., 2005, or Cheshire and Hilber, 2008, in the 
context of building height regulation). In the spirit of Kunreuther and Kleindorfer (1986), we 
suggest that providing residents the option to sell their residential parking permit might be a 
politically acceptable solution which is welfare improving. To create a market for residential 
parking permits has a number of attractive properties: the price of the permits will reflect the 
residents' willingness to pay for parking, households who choose residence locations will 
internalise the social costs of street parking and local governments may reduce (or increase) the 
number of parking permits by buying (selling) the permits at market values. This idea is similar 
in spirit to the idea by Shoup (2004) who proposes to give residents the right to commercially 
exploit street parking and who may keep local parking revenue.   
 29 
 
References 
 
Arnott, R. (2006), Spatial competition between parking garages and downtown parking policy, Transport 
Policy, 13, 458-469. 
Arnott, R. and J. Rowse (2009a), Downtown parking in auto city, Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, 39, 1-14. 
Arnott, R. and J. Rowse (2009b), Curbside parking time limits, mimeo 
Arnott, R., A. De Palma and R. Lindsey (1991), A temporal and spatial equilibrium analysis of commuter 
parking, Journal of Public Economics, 45, 301-335. 
Arnott, R., and E. Inci (2006), An integrated model of downtown parking and traffic congestion, Journal 
of Urban Economics 60, 418-42. 
Axhausen, K.W. and J.W. Polak (1991), Choice of parking: stated preference approach, Transportation, 
18, 1, 59-81. 
Calthrop, E. and S. Proost (2006), Regulating on-street parking, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 
36 29-48. 
CBS New York (2011), City council approves residential parking permit plan, November 
www.newyork.cbslocal.com 
Cheshire, P.C. and C.A.L. Hilber (2008), Office space supply restrictions in Britain: the political 
economy of market revenge, Economic Journal, 118, F185-F221. 
CROW (2008), Parkeercijfers - Basis voor Parkeernormering, EDE, the Netherlands.  
Cutter, W.B. and S.F. Franco (2012), Do parking requirements significantly increase the area dedicated to 
parking? A test of the effect of parking requirements values in Los Angeles County, 
Transportation Research A, 46, 901–925 
Feeney, B.P. (1989) , A review of the impact of parking policy measures on travel, Transportation 
Planning and Technology, 13, 4, 229-244 
Gemeente Amsterdam (2000), Parkeren is manoeuvreren , Dienst Infrastructuur, Verkeer en Vervoer. 
Glaeser, E.L., J. Gyourko and R.E. Saks (2005), Why is Manhattan so expensive? Regulation and the size 
in house prices, Journal of Law and Economics, 48, 2, 331-369. 
Glazer, A. and E. Niskanen (1992), Parking fees and congestion, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 
22, 123-132. 
Hasker, K. and Inci, E (2011), Free parking for all in shopping malls, Sabanci University, Working Paper 
ID:SU_FASS_2010/0004. 
Hensher, D.A. and J. King (2001), Parking demand and responsiveness to supply, pricing and location in 
the Sydney central business district. Transportation Research A, 35A, 177–196. 
 30 
 
Holt, M.T. (2002), Inverse demand systems and choice of functional form, European Economic Review, 
46, 117-142. 
Kelly, J.A. and J.P. Clinch (2006), Influence of varied parking prices on parking occupancy levels by trip 
purpose. Transport Policy, 13, 487–495.  
Kelly, J.A. and J.P. Clinch (2009), Temporal variance of revealed preference on-street parking price 
elasticity. Transport Policy, 16, 193–199.  
Kensington and Chelsea (2012), www.rbkc.gov.uk. 
Kim, J. (2012), Endogenous vehicle-type choices in a monocentric city , Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, 42, 749-760. 
Kobus, M., E.  Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau, P. Rietveld and J.N. van Ommeren (2012), The on-street parking 
premium and car drivers' choice between street and garage parking, Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, forthcoming 
Kunreuther, H. and P. R. Kleindorfer (1986), Sealed-bid auction mechanism for siting noxious facilities, 
American Economic Review , 76, 2, 295-299 
Leichenko, R.M., Coulson, N.E., Listokin, D. (2001). Historic Preservation and Residential Property 
Values: An Analysis of Texas Cities. Urban Studies 38(11): 1973-1987. 
Litman, T. (2012), Understanding transport demands and elasticities, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 
Mingardo, G. and J. van Meerkerk (2012), Is parking supply related to turnover of shopping areas? The 
case of the Netherlands, Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 19(2), 195-201. 
Shoup, D.C. (1999), The trouble with minimum parking requirements, Transportation Research A, 549-
574. 
Shoup, D.C. ( 2004), The ideal source of local public revenue, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 
34, 6, 753-784 
Shoup, D.C. (2005), The High Cost of Free Parking, Planners Press, Chicago. 
Small, K.A. (1997), Economics and urban transport policy in the United States, Regional Science and 
Urban Economics, 27, 671-691. 
Small, K.A. and E.T. Verhoef (2007), The Economics of Urban Transportation, Routledge. 
Transportation Planning and Technology 13(4), 229–244.  
Statistics Netherlands (2008), Central Bureau of Statistics, the Hague. 
Trajan (2009), Onderzoek Korte ritten en optimale grootte vergunningsgebieden. 
Van Dijken (2002), Parkeren in Nederland, IOO, the Hague  
Van Ommeren, J.N., D. Wentink and J. Dekkers (2011), The real price of parking policy, Journal of 
Urban Economics, 70, 25-31  
 31 
 
Van Ommeren, J.N and D. Wentink (2012), The (hidden) costs of employer parking policies, International 
Economic Review, 53,3, 965-977 
Van Ommeren, J.N., D. Wentink and P. Rietveld (2012), Empirical evidence on cruising for parking, 
Transportation Research Part A, 46, 123-130 
Verhoef, E., P. Nijkamp, and P. Rietveld (1995), The economics of regulatory parking policies: the 
(im)possibilities of parking policies in traffic regulation, Transportation Research Part A, 29, 
141-156. 
Vickrey, W.S. (1954), The economizing of curb parking space, Traffic Engineering, 62-67, reprinted in 
Journal of Urban Economics, 1994, 36, 42-65. 
Wheaton, W.C. (2004), Commuting, congestion, and employment dispersal in cities with mixed land use , 
Journal of Urban Economics, 55, 3 , 417-438   
 32 
 
  
 33 
 
APPENDIX 
Table A1:  Garage parking share 
Garage parking share Two-limit Tobit IV Two-limit Tobit 
1 2 3 4 5 
Parking places (/1000) 0.101** 0.069** 0.050* 0.108** 0.094** 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) 
Municipality population -0.117 0.157 -0.121 0.144 
(0.202) (0.238) (0.200) (0.239) 
Municipality population density 0.153** 0.163** 0.139** 0.144** 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Shopping district type no no yes no yes 
Constant -0.147 -0.303 0.310 -0.340 -0.320 
(0.053) (0.059) (0.182) (0.061) (0.178) 
Log likelihood -232 -211 -209 -2732 -2721 
No of observations 308 308 308 308 308 
No of obs., no garage parking 147 147 147 147 147 
No of obs., no street parking 18 18 18 18 18 
F-test  (weak instruments)    707.03 582.26 
For notes, see Table 2. 
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Table A2: Inverse parking supply functions using different thresholds 
Day price €4 threshold €10 threshold 
   Garage present   Garage present 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parking places (/1000) 2.985** 3.228** 2.704** 2.789** 2.786** 2.869** 2.821** 2.941** 
(0.279) (0.321) (0.313) (0.385) (0.309) (0.372) (0.387) (0.504) 
Municipality population 13.7** 11.1** 10.9** 10.4* 15.5** 13.6** 13.5** 11.5* 
(2.63) (3.21) (3.38) (4.31) (3.04) (3.89) (4.17) (5.60) 
Municipality population density 0.978* 0.813* 0.481 0.429 0.455 0.388 0.382 0.338 
(0.409) (0.413) (0.467) (0.475) (0.490) (0.484) (0.613) (0.612) 
Shopping district type no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Log likelihood -2663 -2638 -1467 -1458 -2458 -2438 -1319 -1313 
No of observations 275 275 138 138 275 275 138 138 
No  of obs. below threshold 162 162 45 45 219 219 95 95 
F-test (weak instruments) 754.05 669.77 399.20 284.26 754.05 669.77 399.20 284.26 
Note: regression on parking price. The censoring threshold is € 4 in specification 1-4 and € 10 in specifications 5-8. 
* Significant at 5 per cent level, ** Significant at 1 per cent level. 
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Table A3: Inverse parking supply functions, for minimum city size 
Day price 
 (1) (2) 
Parking places (/1000) 2.727** 2.465** 
 (0.538) (0.460) 
Shop space rent (median) 0.027 0.019 
 (0.027) (0.024) 
Shopping district type yes yes 
Municipality fixed effects yes yes 
   
Log likelihood -419 -495 
No of observations 42 50 
No  of obs. below threshold 10 12 
Minimum city size 100,000 50,000 
F-test (weak instruments) 130.42 144.96 
Note: IV Tobit estimates. For other notes, see Table 2. 
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Table A4: Inverse parking supply functions (hour price) 
Hour price IV Tobit IV Tobit Log-log 
   Garage present   Garage present 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parking places (/1000) 0.381** 0.425** 0.312** 0.310** 0.746** 0.987** 0.570** 0.584** 
(0.041) (0.047) (0.044) (0.053) (0.098) (0.149) (0.093) (0.138) 
Municipality population 0.795* 0.492 0.368 0.584 0.345** 0.196 0.258** 0.294** 
(0.381) (0.451) (0.449) (0.557) (0.069) (0.105) (0.074) (0.109) 
Municipality population density 0.246** 0.237** 0.220** 0.232** 0.153* 0.125 0.099 0.102 
(0.059) (0.060) (0.067) (0.068) (0.075) (0.080) (0.087) (0.088) 
Shopping district type no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Log likelihood -3163 -2804 -1536 -1530 -615 -596 -340 -333 
No of observations 308 308 161 161 308 308 161 161 
No  of obs. below threshold 147 147 42 42 147 147 42 42 
F-test (weak instruments) 707.03 582.26 401.60 271.26 215.80 116.86 138.06 62.57 
Note: regression on parking price. The censoring threshold is 0.35 in the linear analyses and log (0.35) in the log-log 
analyses. * Significant at 5 per cent level, ** Significant at 1 per cent level. 
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Table A5:  Inverse parking supply functions (no instrumenting) 
Day price Tobit  Tobit (Log-log) 
   Garage present   Garage present 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parking places (/1000) 2.565** 2.504** 2.044** 1.740** 0.630** 0.525** 0.427** 0.148 
(0.244) (0.272) (0.272) (0.313) (0.091) (0.104) (0.108) (0.128) 
Municipality population 14.5** 15.4** 12.3** 17.1** 0.493** 0.623** 0.401** 0.689** 
(2.72) (3.31) (3.43) (4.19) (0.080) (0.105) (0.091) (0.119) 
Municipality population density 1.037 1.092 0.497 0.632 0.191 0.211 0.063 0.090 
(0.411) (0.413) (0.471) (0.469) (0.086) (0.084) (0.098) (0.093) 
Shopping district type no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Log likelihood -508 -506 -361 -358 -264 -258 -162 -154 
No of observations 275 275 138 138 275 275 138 138 
No  of obs. below threshold 141 141 36 36 141 141 36 36 
Note: municipality population in millions. Population density in thousand persons per square meter. The censoring threshold is 
€2 in the linear analyses and log (€2) in the log-log analyses. * Significant at 5 per cent level, ** Significant at 1 per cent level. 
 
